DRAFT DCI BRIEFING FOR VINSON SUBCOMMITTEE

CUBA

- I. In Cuba, the last major withdrawal of Soviet military personnel appears to have been completed.
 - A. Since the 1962 missile crisis, some 20,000 Soviet servicemen have been pulled out in four major withdrawal periods, with about 5,000 personnel leaving the island during each period.
 - B. The most recent period extended from the beginning of May through the end of July, during which time more than 5,000 Russians sailed from Cuba on 14 Soviet passenger ships.
- II. It now appears that there are only about 2,000 Soviet military technicians and advisors left in what has become essentially a Soviet military aid and advisory group on the island.
 - A. All Soviet communications facilities in Cuba have been deactivated or turned over to the Cubans except for one naval link which will probably terminate operations soon.

B. No Soviet operational or combat units are known to remain on the island.

Thus the Cubans almost certainly have full control over the operation of all Soviet weapons left behind, including the surface-to-air missiles.

A. The Soviets have removed all their sensitive radar and communications gear, and as far as we can tell, they now give only advice to the Cubans armed forces, backed up by their political and economic leverage.

However, we cannot exclude the possibility that the Soviets have retained some sort of physical restraint over the actual firing of the SA-2 missiles in Cuba.

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IV. Both the Soviets and Cubans have indicated, however, that they do not intend to get into a wrangle over the U-2 issue until after the US elections, at which time Castro has said he will take the issue to the UN General Assembly.

A. Castro also took the occasion of his 26 July speech to play down the U-2 issue somewhat. He said that "for the sake of peace" he would be patient with the U-2 planes for the time being.

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- There is always the possibility of an unauthorized shootdown or an impulsive decision by Castro in reaction to an exile raid or minor clash with the US.
- 2. In any case, Castro probably has little confidence that the Soviets would provide any real assistance if the US forcibly reacted to a U-2 shootdown.
- v. Castro's defiant reaction to OAS sanctions against his regime indicates no letup of Cuban subversion in Latin America. It belies a report we had from Venezeula early in July that Cuba, possibly at Soviet urging, was restricting its support for revolutionaries.
 - VA. Castro in his 26 July speech asserted Cuba's right to support revolutionaries in any country which opposes his regime.
 - 1. He specifically sent his encouragement to the "courageous" rebels and guer-rillas of Venezuela and Guatemala.
 - B. The speech suggested that only those countries which shun the effort to isolate

 Cuba can count on immunity from Cuban

 subversion.

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- 1. He praised Mexico in particular for voting against the OAS sanctions, and offered to conclude a mutual non-intervention treaty.
- 2. He added that Chile, Uruguay, and Bolivia -- which also opposed the sanctions--could join in.

indicate continued

Cuban support for extremist revolutionary groups, some of which are planning steppedup operations in the fall.

Cuban attache in Mexico City met clandestinely on 22 July with Honduran Communists to offer arms and funds to help them get guerrilla operations going by September or October. Honduran Communists who have been trained in Cuba in guerrilla warfare are beginning to infiltrate back

Cuba is reportedly providing \$7,500 a month to support left-extremist organizations in Peru. Peru's best-equipped group for guerrilla warfare now is reported to be planning to begin operations in October.

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into Honduras.

- C. Venezuela's pro-Castro FALN--the Armed
 Forces of National Liberation--also is
 reliably reported to be preparing for
 a renewed terrorist campaign in October.
- D. The former Cuban ambassador to Brazil and a known Cuban intelligence officer recently met an emissary of ex-Brazilian President Goulart's brother-in-law, Leonel Brizola, to offer him assistance in carrying out guerrilla operations against the Castello Branco government.

E. ______

new information on Cuba's principal organization for "exporting the revolution" to Latin America.

the General Directorate of Intelligence

(DGI). Its main purpose is to channel Cuban advice and assistance to Latin

American "national liberation" groups.

The DGI appears to be a highly profes-

sional organization, and is advised by

Soviet intelligence experts.

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